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The paper analyzes the effects of present-biased preferences on the transfer of resources to future generations 
in the framework of renewable resource harvesting. The paper assumes that the current generation has other-
regarding motivations for future generations, expressed through the adherence to spontaneous other-regarding 
preferences or social norms.  
Because the short-sighted behavior imposed by the “dictatorship of the present” can cause a reduction in the 
well-being of future generations, despite the existence of social preferences, the model presented in this study 
demonstrates that if the social preferences are also expressed through social norms that prescribe no reevaluation 
of the harvesting decisions, a mitigation of the effect of present bias on intergenerational equity can occur.  
In this paper, the model presented shows the properties that a social norm should have to avoid the 
intergenerational inequality that can be derived from present-biased preferences in intergenerational renewable 
resource management. Additionally, the model defines the necessary and sufficient conditions such that the 
implementation of the social norm can neutralize the effect of present-biased preferences, guaranteeing the 
optimal harvesting path defined at the beginning. 
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1. Introduction 
In the last few years, studies have started to explore the applications of the non-constant 
discount rate in resource management (Settle and Shogren, 2004) and in contexts related to 
the environment (Brekke and Johansson-Stenman, 2008; Karp, 2005). They have started to 
show the dichotomy between the present-biased agents and the rational agents (Hepburn et 
al., 2010; Winkler, 2006). As Gsottbauer and van den Bergh (2011) remarked, time 
preferences has a crucial role in resources conservation. However, the studies that have 
investigated non-constant discounting in resource management have excluded from their 
analysis the other-regarding preferences. The assertion is well-founded, and the reasons for 
the necessity to include them are clear: other-regarding preferences are found in everyday 
life, with the evidence that individuals have carefulness concepts such as fairness (Gintis, 
2000), and they adopt pro-social behaviors in a wide range of situations (Alpizar et al., 2008; 
Frey and Meier, 2004; Meier and Stutzer, 2008) and in different cultures (Henrich et al., 
2005). Furthermore, several robust studies have demonstrated the validity of an inclusion of 
other-regarding motives in the study of economic behavior (Fehr and Gächter, 2002, 2000; 
Gächter, 2007; Gintis et al., 2005).  
Often, renewable resources assume an intergenerational dimension because of their intrinsic 
nature. The activity of harvesting renewable resources is the typical context in which the 
externalities derived from the behavior of a single agent within a community often generate 
effects not only on other members of the community that act simultaneously. Frequently, 
negative externalities can affect future generations whose welfare depends on the level of 
impoverishment to which the resources were exposed. 
When resource management can suffer the risk related to the present bias, it is necessary to 
understand in what manner present-biased behaviors affect the intertemporal dynamics in 
relation to the intergenerational preferences of a naive agent who has social preferences over 
her or his successors. Present bias and the resulting reversal preferences can change the 
outcome of the other-regarding choices posed at the beginning by the agent who has to leave 
some part of the resources for future generations. For these reasons, the purpose of this work 
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is to investigate the effects of present bias in renewable resource management by analyzing 
the impact of myopic behaviors on the transfer of resources from the current generation to 
the next generation while considering other-regarding and social preferences of the first 
generation. Additionally, this paper focuses on how an agent can express her or his social and 
other-regarding preferences; notably, they can be expressed with the spontaneous choices 
taken in accord with other-regarding preferences without social or institutional interventions, 
but also with the compliance to the specific social norms that the community defines.  
The capability of society to define social norms is one of the elements that characterize 
sociability. Notably, communities and individuals also express their other-regarding 
preferences through social norms. In this paper, one of the main aims is to define the 
properties that a social norm must have to avoid the negative effect of present-biased 
preferences on the transfer amount of future generations. For these reasons, this work 
provides a model that introduces a social norm in the context in which present-biased 
preferences can affect intergenerational equity in presence of other-regarding preferences of 
the present generation. The results address the opportunity to adopt social norms that sustain 
the intergenerational distribution of resources while considering that the capability of 
building a behavioral norm inside a community is one of the most notable and peculiar 
features of human sociability. 
 
2. Intertemporal myopia in resource management 
Resource management is difficult, especially in cases of important decisional myopia 
(Pevnitskaya and Ryvkin, 2013). In intergenerational management of resources, conflicts can 
occur between long-run preferences and immediate choices because of present-biased 
preferences; additionally, a conflict emerges between the early intention of the agent and the 
choice made in the present. The conflict arises because of the time dependency of the discount 
rate, generating time-inconsistent decisions. A time inconsistency situation implies that an 
optimal choice defined in the present could be revisited in the future (Strotz, 1955). The 
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origin of this phenomenon is the present bias that determines the emergence of preference 
reversals. When the task involves intertemporal decisions, the absence of a constant discount 
rate determines the condition of the possible revaluation of the choices made, changing it 
from what was estimated before. Behaviors that contradict the time-consistency assumption 
have been widely studied (Frederick et al., 2002; Loewenstein and Prelec, 1992). The 
systematic tendency of a greater discount in the near future rather than in the distant future 
is a consequence of individuals’ impulsiveness and lack of self-control (Laibson, 1997; 
O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999), and clearly, the exponential discounting cannot represent this 
phenomenon (Laibson, 1997). 
The effects of present bias have been investigated in several areas: low saving rate (Ashraf 
et al., 2006; Harris and Laibson, 2001; Laibson, 1997; Laibson et al., 1998), health contexts 
(van der Pol and Cairns, 2002), drugs, smoking or buying addictions (Frederick et al., 2002; 
Gruber and Koszegi, 2001; Thaler and Shefrin, 1981; Wertenbroch, 1998), and behaviors of 
procrastination (Benabou and Tirole, 2003; O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999). In addition to the 
aforementioned areas, resource management is a field where present bias has a strong 
potential impact. Notably, the risks associated with preference reversals and the “dictatorship 
of the present” increase in settings where long-term interests may conflict with immediate 
consumption. This conflict typically emerges in all fields of public and common goods—in 
public goods, this is emphasized by Winkler (2006), and in the fields of the common the role 
of present-biased preferences in the decreasing of cooperation is shown by Persichina 
(2019b)—and this conflict strongly characterizes intergenerational resource management.  
The harvesting of natural resources is a typical area where this conflict can emerge. In this 
case, present-biased decisions can potentially lead to excessive resource depletion. It was 
shown that if non-constant discount rates are applied in the management of a stock of natural 
resources, without a commitment to the policy implemented, the possibility that the 
governance planner revaluates the plan will lead to a collapse of the resources (Hepburn et 
al., 2010). Settle and Shogren (2004) demonstrated that non-constant discounting affects 
optimal resource management because it makes possible the offering of a justification for a 
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future change in the decisions of the policymaker. Therefore, in intergenerational 
management, present-biased preferences could compromise the wise management of the 
resource stock. The use of a higher discount rate in the short term can determine that the 
community’s welfare, which also includes the well-being of future generations, which would 
be jeopardized by the excessive weight of the present. 
However, when the query involves renewable resources from the intergenerational 
perspective, the discussion is not limited to the impoverishment of the stock of resources for 
effect of the allocation of the harvesting amounts over time by the present generation for their 
own consumption preferences. In the presence of more generations that harvest in succession 
from the same stock of renewable resources, the issue also involves the social dimension in 
relation to the intergenerational equity and welfare of future generations. Notably, as 
discussed in the next section, individuals have social preferences such that they assign a 
positive value to the welfare of future generations. Therefore, in intertemporal resource 
management, present generations also include the welfare of future generations in their 
decision process. In this manner, the present generation aims to behave in accordance with 
its own social preferences, leaving a given amount of resources for the consumption of the 
following generations. As long as the intertemporal choices of the individual are time-
consistent, the outcome of the decision taken also clearly responds to the social preferences 
of the individual. However, in the absence of time consistency, when the agent behaves 
myopically under the effect of present bias, the coherence between improved action and the 
early intention of the individual can fade. 
 
3. A retrospective on other-regarding motives 
In a common resource dilemma, economic theory prescribes the overexploitation of 
resources, synthesized by the famous expression “tragedy of the commons” used by Hardin 
(1968). This phenomenon depends on the benefit that the agent obtains from an extra unit of 
consumption of the commons when the cost of the reduction of the stock of resources is 
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divided between all the members of the community that can use it, not only between those 
who consume the extra units. Therefore, agents who make decisions exclusively based on 
their self-interest without considering the consequences on the wealth of others contribute to 
the overexploitation of the common resources. The standard assumption about the economic 
behavior of agents is the axiom of self-interest. This axiom is a behavioral assumption that is 
defined in the function of a coherent adhesion to the three logical processes that define the 
behavior of a homo oeconomicus—self-centered welfare, self-welfare goal, and self-goal 
choice (Sen, 1985)—building a theoretical system of economic interactions composed of 
exclusive selfish agents. However, events that contradict this assumption are observable daily 
in the reality of human interactions. The exclusive self-interested axiomatization does not 
appear to represent the peculiarities of human behavior. Interdependence between one’s own 
wealth and others’ health exists, and this is the foundation of society. Hence, economic issues 
that involve the social dimension of human behavior require economists to relax the 
assumption that agents are only self-interested. 
Several studies have investigated the real foundation of economics when the agents make 
decisions within a social context, showing with undoubted clarity that individual decisions 
are mediated by other-regarding motives and by social preferences, such as fairness, 
cooperation, and reciprocity (Andreoni, 1990; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Charness and 
Rabin, 2002; Falk and Fischbacher, 2006; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Rabin, 1993). 
To understand the role of other-regarding preferences in social dilemmas, many researchers 
have demonstrated that fairness principles contribute to the formulation of the agent's choices 
(Fehr and Gächter, 2000; Gächter, 2007; Ostrom et al., 1992). Several analyses and 
investigations have confirmed the ability of humans to voluntarily sustain cooperation in the 
case of resource dilemmas (Andreoni, 1988; Casari and Plott, 2003; Charness and Villeval, 
2009; Chaudhuri, 2011; Fehr and Leibbrandt, 2011; Ledyard, 1994; Ostrom et al., 1992). 
Furthermore, the consequences of the introduction of other-regarding preferences in the 
theoretical framework of the management of commons and in environmental and resource 
issues have acquired great attention more recently (Brekke and Johansson-Stenman, 2008; 
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Carlsson and Johansson-Stenman, 2012; Frey and Stutzer, 2006; Gowdy, 2008; Gsottbauer 
and van den Bergh, 2011). 
Other-regarding motives have a critical role in the management of renewable resources in 
terms of equity distribution. As Fehr and Fischbacher (2005) pointed out, “other-regarding 
preferences” means that the agents show these preferences when they give value to the 
payoffs of the reference agents. In the context of renewable resources, the fairness principle 
becomes a crucial element in the decision process that occurs to determine how much to 
harvest and consume to behave in conformity to an individual’s other-regarding preferences. 
The others are not only those that simultaneously harvest the same resources but also the 
successors who will harvest when the resources are assigned to intergenerational use. Hence, 
the inclusion of other-regarding preferences is essential for the equity distribution principles 
that affect the harvesting strategies taking care of the intergenerational externalities.  
This occurs because on one side, there are no doubts about the existence of cooperation and 
equity distribution capabilities of individuals—these capabilities are part of the success of 
human evolution (Gintis, 2009); on the other side, the reason why societies sometimes do not 
attain the level of fairness and intergenerational equity that they desire is unclear. For this 
reason, in the following sections, the effects of the present bias are investigated in relation to 
the welfare of future generations and on the role that a social norm can have in the 
maintenance of intergenerational equity when the norm is designed to sustain other-regarding 
preferences of the agent. 
 
4. Harvesting model and behavioral assumptions  
The model involves the harvesting activity from a stock of renewable resources: at time t, the 
stock of resources is 𝑅(𝑡) and the amount harvested is ℎ(𝑡), the growth rate is 𝑓(𝑔, 𝑅(𝑡)), 
and the stock grows by following 
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𝑅(𝑡 + 1) − 𝑅(𝑡) = 𝑓(𝑔, 𝑅(𝑡))𝑅(𝑡) − ℎ(𝑡),  (1) 
where (𝑔, 𝑅(𝑡)) ≥ 0 ∀ 𝑡 ∈ [0, 𝑇]; 𝑔, strictly positive, is the natural growth rate when the 
stock size does not affect the growth rate.1 Resources are materials; thus, it is not possible to 
have a negative stock of resources, and the initial level of the stock is strictly positive: 𝑅(𝑡) ≥ 0 ∀ 𝑡 ∈ [0, 𝑇] (2) 
with 𝑅(0) = 𝑅0 ,  𝑅0 > 0. (3) 
The amount harvested is not restorable such that ℎ(𝑡) ≥ 0  ∀  𝑡 ∈ [0, 𝑇]. (4) 
According to the resource constraint, the agent cannot harvest at time t more than the stock 
of resources available at the same time: ℎ(𝑡) ≤ 𝑅(𝑡) ∀ 𝑡 ∈ [0, 𝑇]. (5) 
In the model, there are two generations, one that harvests for T periods, and a second one that 
receives the resources left unharvested from the first generation.2 
The welfare’s agent of the first generation depends only on the amount harvested, and the 
utility function is expressed in the usual form: 
                                                 
1Resources in the stock are not perishable; for this reason, the growth rate is non-negative. And when 𝜕𝑓(𝑔,𝑅(𝑡))𝜕𝑅(𝑡) = 0, the growth rate is constant exponential. 
2 The model focuses on the decision-making process of the first generation. 
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𝑈 =∑𝛿𝑡𝑢(ℎ(𝑡))𝑇𝑡=0 , (6) 
where 𝑢(ℎ(𝑡)) is monotonic and strictly concave: 
𝑢′(ℎ(𝑡)) >  0, 𝑢′′(ℎ(𝑡)) < 0. (7) 
Continuity of the harvesting amount is assumed. 𝛿𝑡 represents the discount factor. The cases 
of neutrality in the harvesting time and of pleasure in procrastination are excluded, such that 𝛿𝑡 > 𝛿𝑡+1 ∀ 𝑡 ∈ [0, 𝑇]. (8) 
The first generation is affected by the present bias, which implies 
{ 
 𝛿𝑡𝛿𝑡+1 > 𝛿𝑠𝛿𝑠+1       with   𝑡 < 𝑠   and   𝑠 ∈ [0, 𝑇]  for 𝑡 = 0,𝛿𝑡𝛿𝑡+1 = 𝛿𝑠𝛿𝑠+1       with   𝑡 < 𝑠   and   𝑡, 𝑠 ∈ [0, 𝑇]  for 𝑡 > 0. (9) 
Of course, in this condition, time consistency is impossible. 
In this work to express the presence of present-biased preferences in the utility function of 
the agent, we use a β𝛿 model where the present bias factor is defined with β, such that the 
expected utility of the agent at time t is given by 
𝑈𝑡 = 𝑢(ℎ(𝑡)) + 𝛽 ∑ 𝛿(𝑡)𝑢(ℎ(𝑡)),𝑇𝑡=𝑡+1  (10) 
with 0 < β < 1. 
When β is less than 1, condition (9) holds. Instead, β =1 is the specific case of the absence 
of present bias, such that the discounting is classic exponential. 
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The second generation in the model is the future generation that, for obvious reasons, has no 
decision-making roles; it is the receiver of the residual stock of resources left unharvested by 
the first generation. Thus, an intergenerational transfer occurs, namely, the amount not 
harvested in the last period by the first generation is the initial stock for the subsequent 
generation: [1+𝑓(𝑔, 𝑅(𝑡))]𝑅(𝑇) − ℎ(𝑇) = 𝐷, (11) 
where D represents the initial stock for the second generation.  
Of course, if the first generation is absolutely selfish, nothing will be left to the next 
generation. However, total selfishness is not the real behavior of agents, because it is 
explicated in the retrospective on the other-regarding behaviors. Hence, in this model, the 
agent of the first generation takes care of the amount available for the successor because she 
or he has social preferences regarding intergenerational distribution. Thus, the first 
generation leaves a given amount, D, unharvested at the end of the period T for the second 
generation. 
The amount D depends on the lifetime-expected enjoyed revenue that the first agent (or 
generation) obtains, 𝜋, given the instantaneous utility of the agent such that 
𝜋 =∑𝑢(ℎ(𝑡))𝑇𝑡=0 . (12) 
The transferred amount also depends on the intergenerational equity of the first generation, 
represented by a generic constant parameter, 𝛼, which is exogenous and unchangeable; 
hence, 𝐷 = 𝑓(𝛼, 𝜋). (13) 
The amount transferred to the second generation increases with the increase in the lifetime 
enjoyed revenue of the first generation: 
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𝜕𝐷(𝛼, 𝜋)𝜕𝜋 > 0. (14) 
At any period, the agent of the first generation defines the harvesting plan, including the 
expected amount to transfer to the second generation. 
 
5. Consequences of present-biased behaviors on the welfare of future generations in 
the presence of other-regarding preferences 
This paragraph questions how the adoption of the harvesting strategy influenced by present-
biased preferences affects the intergenerational transfer, given the assumption of the presence 
of social preferences. Understanding how the presence of present-biased preferences can 
affect the transfer amount to the following generation is a necessary step to understand the 
context in which the social norms should be implemented. 
The intertemporal harvesting plan of the agent is given by the maximization of the utility 
function (10) under the constraints expressed in (2), (3), (4), and (5); the growth of the stock 
is given by (1); and the agent face the (11). To show the effect of present-biased preferences 
on the intergenerational transfer, in the first step, the effect on the lifetime-expected revenue 
enjoyed by the first generation must emerge.  
Hence, at time 0, the agent formulates the optimal harvesting plan for her or his lifetime: 𝐻𝑜𝑝𝑡 = {ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(0),… , ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡𝑏), … , ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑇)}. (15) 
However, the agent adopts present-biased decisions; thus, there are no guarantees for the time 
consistency of the choices time after time. In this manner, the strategy effectively 
implemented by the naive agent does not coincide with the initial long-run optimal plan 
formulated at time 0; thus, the harvesting plan implemented will be a biased expressed as 
follows: 
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𝐻𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠 = {ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(0),… , ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑡𝑏), … , ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑇)}, (16) 
where Hbias is defined as the amounts derived time after time by the instantaneous 
maximization of the utility expressed in (10), under the constraints defined before, when β is 
lower than 1. 
Because (9) implies that, with 0 < 𝑡𝑏 < 𝑠, at time 0: 𝛿𝑡𝑏𝛿𝑡𝑏+1 = 𝛿𝑠𝛿𝑠+1, (17) 
but later at time 𝑡𝑏 is 𝛿𝑡𝑏𝛿𝑡𝑏+1 > 𝛿𝑠𝛿𝑠+1 ; (18) 
then, at time 𝑡𝑏, the agent harvests an amount greater in the biased harvesting plan, such that ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑡𝑏) > ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡𝑏). (19) 
The direct consequence of an increment of the current harvested amount is that because there 
is one optimal solution at each time, to divert away from the harvesting path that was, 
guarantees the higher lifetime utility evaluated until the previous period. The consequence is 
consistent with Persichina (2019a), that is, the lifetime-expected enjoyed revenue that the 
agent obtains in the biased harvesting plan adopted, 𝐻𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠, can be lower than in the 
hypothetical optimal plan evaluated at time 0, 𝐻𝑜𝑝𝑡: 
∑𝑢(ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑡)) <∑𝑢 (ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡))𝑇𝑡=0𝑇𝑡=0 . (20) 
Hence, the present bias can induce the agent of the first generation to adopt a strategy that 
implies an expected enjoyed revenue, 𝜋𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠, lower than that expected at the beginning, 𝜋𝑜𝑝𝑡. 
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Thus, the present bias can create inefficiency in the intertemporal management of the 
resources. Additionally, will this inefficiency persists even if the naive agent has spontaneous 
other-regarding preferences such as in this model in which the first generation desires to leave 
resources to the following generation but the amount to transfer depends on the revenue of 
the first generation. 
Hence, considering that at time 0 the agent had defined a given harvesting plan, Hopt, such 
that she or he had predicted to obtain a given expected enjoyed revenue 𝜋𝑜𝑝𝑡, the predicted 
amount to leave for the future generation predicted at time 0 was defined in relation to the 
predicted revenue 𝜋𝑜𝑝𝑡, such that 𝐷𝑜𝑝𝑡 = 𝑓(𝛼, 𝜋𝑜𝑝𝑡). (21) 
At time 𝑡𝑏, the present bias induces the agent to reevaluate her or his harvesting plan. The 
consequence, expressed in (20), can imply that the enjoyed revenue derived from the biased 
harvesting plan, 𝜋𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠, is lower than 𝜋𝑜𝑝𝑡, such that at time 𝑡𝑏, the transfer amount is 
reevaluated in the function of the new level of expected enjoyed revenue, 𝜋𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠: 𝐷𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠 = 𝑓(𝛼, 𝜋𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠) (22) 
Thus, considering (14), a decrease in 𝜋 determines a decrease in the transfer amount such 
that 𝐷𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠 < 𝐷𝑜𝑝𝑡. (23) 
At this point, we easily understand that when 𝜋𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠 < 𝜋𝑜𝑝𝑡, period after period, when the 
effect of present-biased preferences emerges, the predicted transferred amount becomes 
smaller and smaller. In the final period T, the amount effectively left for the future generation 
will be lower than the amount that the agent would have left given the same intergenerational 
preferences but without the present bias that moves her or him away from her or his long-run 
harvesting path. 
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Therefore, a biased harvesting plan can determine a reduction in the maximum welfare 
available for the future generation. The second generation, hence, suffers the consequences 
of a bias that affects the previous generation, with the reduction of the initial stock of 
resources that the second generation receives despite the initial other-regarding intentions of 
the first generation. For this reason, this work aims to understand which properties a social 
norm should have to avoid the intergenerational inequality that can derive from present-
biased preferences in intergenerational renewable resources management. 
 
6. Implementation of the social norm 
In the context in which the spontaneous social preferences of a present-biased agent are not 
sufficient to avoid the risks related to the present-biased discounting, an individual harvester 
could leave to the future generation less than she or he originally desired. In this case, the 
support of social norms that can induce her or him to apply a sort of self-commitment to her 
or his original choices may be decisive. Notably, the compliance with social norms that 
require leaving an amount to the future generation not amenable to revision could offer the 
opportunity to commit the behavior of the agent to the first intention. The social norm, in this 
case, will be a nudge to facilitate the agent to behave conformal to her or his initial intention 
(Sunstein, 2014). 
The implementation of a social norm that prescribes to follow the initial harvesting plan can 
improve intergenerational equity. Notably, when individuals act in accordance with their 
spontaneous intergenerational preferences, without being bound by social norms, there is no 
constraint that avoids the revaluation of the transfer amount. Thus, the conservation of 
resources for future generations is not guaranteed. Conversely, the situation of the transferred 
amount could differ if the agent manifests her or his intergenerational preferences in the 
compliance with a social norm that prescribes a donation to the future generation of a 
determined amount, set out at the beginning of the harvesting periods, and thus defined 
according to the initial stock of resources. For this reason, we conduct an analysis of the 
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presence of this type of social norm. The goal is to define the main properties of a model that 
includes the disutility derived from a violation of the social norm that prescribes that the 
amount transferred, defined at the beginning, must not be subject to revaluation.  
The model assumes that the violation of a social norm implies for the agent a disutility that 
reduces the instantaneous utility at the moment when the violation occurs. The disutility 
derived by a violation of the social norm is defined with η such that the instantaneous utility 
of the present harvesting is given by 𝑢(𝑡) = 𝑢(ℎ(𝑡)) − 𝜂𝑡 . (24) 
An assumption is that at time tb, if the agent harvest is not more of the amount initially 
planned ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡𝑏), the disutility that she or he receives is zero because no violation of social 
norms occurs. Otherwise, if she or he increases the harvesting above ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡𝑏), she or he 
receives a disutility η, that is, a no decreasing function in the difference between the current 
harvesting and the amount in initially planned, ℎ(𝑡) − ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡),3 and this difference is denoted 
with γ such that 𝜕𝜂𝜕𝛾  ≥ 0, (25) 
Moreover, η is also a function of the parameter 𝛼∗ that represents the value that the agent 
assigns to comply with the social norm, such that the disutility that the social norm generates 
when the agents violate the norm, 𝑓(𝛼∗, 𝛾),4 increases with an increase in 𝛼∗: 
                                                 
3 A higher difference in the amount harvested represents a stronger violation of the social norm; consequently, 
a bigger difference between the current harvesting and the amount initially planned should imply a higher 
disutility derived by the social norm, and in no case a decreasing disutility. 
4𝛼∗ is assumed exogenous and unchangeable. 
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𝜕𝑓(𝛼∗,𝛾)𝜕𝛼∗ > 0, (26) 
such that the disutility at time tb will be given by 
𝜂𝑡𝑏 = { 0, ℎ(𝑡𝑏) ≤ ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡𝑏)𝑓(𝛼∗, 𝛾), ℎ(𝑡𝑏) > ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡𝑏) (27) 
with 𝛾 = ℎ(𝑡𝑏) − ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡𝑏) and 𝑓(𝛼∗, 𝛾) > 0, 
Thus, the total expected utility of the agent at time tb is 
 
𝑈𝑡𝑏 = ∑ 𝛿𝑡𝑢(h(𝑡)) − 𝜂ℎ𝑡𝑏𝑇𝑡=𝑡𝑏 , (28) 
with ∂U∂𝜂 < 0 for 𝜂 > 0. 
Given the model just described, here, the analysis is interested in defining the two main 
peculiarities of the existence of a social norm that prescribes the non-revaluation: the 
necessary condition to have positive effects to reduce the overharvesting generated by 
present-biased preferences, and the sufficient condition to maintain the harvesting at the 
optimal level initially planned. 
6.1. Necessary condition 
The necessary condition is the condition such that a disutility derived by the violation of the 
social norm does not induce the agent to increase the harvesting above ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑡𝑏), and at the 
same time avoid the situation in which independently from the disutility derived by the social 
norm the agent will continue in any case to harvest ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑡𝑏). Notably, to have positive effects 
on the agent’s harvesting, the agent’s utility must be reduced when she or he does not behave 
in compliance with the social norm, but without the situation in which the reduction in the 
utility generated by non-compliance behavior induces the agent to further increase the 
harvesting amount, even above ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑡𝑏). 
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In Proposition 1, we enunciate the necessary condition:5 
Proposition 1: 
It is considered time tb, in which ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑡𝑏) > ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡𝑏) in the absence of the social norm. 
With {H} defined as the set of all feasible harvesting strategies defined for the interval [𝑡𝑏, T], 
and with {𝐻𝑖}  ⊂  {H} the subset of all the feasible alternative strategies to 𝐻𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠. We assume 
the presence of the social norm such that the instantaneous utility of the present-biased agent 
at time tb is 𝑢(𝑡𝑏) = 𝑢(ℎ(𝑡𝑏)) − 𝜂𝑡𝑏, assuming that 𝜂𝑡𝑏is defined as in (27), and defining 
with ℎ𝑖(𝑡𝑏), the amount that the agent harvests in the presence of the social norm if 𝑓(𝛼∗, 𝛾) → 𝜕𝜂𝜕𝛾 > 0 ∀ ℎ(𝑡) > ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡), (29) 
then  ∄ ℎ𝑖(𝑡𝑏) > ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑡𝑏) ∶ 𝐻𝑖 ≽ 𝐻𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠∀ 𝐻𝑖 ∈ {𝐻𝑖}. (30) 
Thus, the necessary condition asserts that if the marginal disutility derived from the violation 
of the norms is increasing over the marginal increase of the overharvesting in excess to the 
optimal amount initially planned, ℎ(𝑡) − ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡), in presence of social norm does not exist 
at an amount greater than the present-biased amount harvested in absence of a norm such that 
a harvesting path with an amount higher than ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑡) can be preferred by the agent. Hence, 
under condition (29), the presence of a social norm that prescribes the non-revaluation cannot 
induce the naive agent to harvest an amount higher than the amount harvested in the absence 
of that social norm. 
The the social norm, to have the possibility to reduce the effect of present bias on the 
harvesting amount and consequently on the transferred amount to the future generation, needs 
                                                 
5 The proof is presented in the appendix. 
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to generate a strictly marginal increasing disutility on the increasing of the difference between 
the amount effectively harvested and the amount initially planned. Notably, a strictly 
increasing disutility on the amount harvested in excess to ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡) in no cases will induce the 
agent to move farther away from the harvesting path. A social norm with this peculiarity 
could reduce the effect of the present bias on the amount transferred to the future generation. 
6.2. Sufficient condition 
Now, we focus on the definition of the condition in which the existence of a social norms that 
prescribe avoiding the revaluation can guarantee the optimal harvesting path defined at the 
beginning, guaranteeing the optimality of the harvesting amount over time and of the 
transferred amount to the following generation, given the presence of other-regarding 
preferences and of social norms even when the agent has present-biased preferences.  
We assume that a higher difference in the amount harvested represents a stronger violation 
of the social norms, and consequently, a bigger difference between the current harvesting and 
the amount initially planned should imply a higher disutility derived from the social norm 
such that 𝜕𝜂𝜕𝛾 > 0, and this guarantees the condition expressed in Proposition 1. 
The time horizon [𝑡𝑏, 𝑇] is considered because as aforementioned, we assume that time 𝑡𝑏 is 
the earlier period in which the agent reevaluates her or his harvesting amount to effect the 
present bias; thus, the harvesting path adopted does not differ from 𝐻𝑜𝑝𝑡 until time 𝑡𝑏 − 1. 
In the model presented, the sufficient condition that guarantees the compliance with the 
optimal harvesting path defined at the beginning has to satisfy the following: 
where ℎ𝑗(𝑡) is the amount harvested at time t given the harvesting strategy 𝐻𝑗 ∈ {Hj}, where {Hj} is the set of all the feasible strategies at time 𝑡𝑏 alternative to 𝐻𝑜𝑝𝑡. 
𝑢[ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡𝑏)] + 𝛽 ∑ 𝛿(𝑡𝑏)𝑡−𝑡𝑏𝑇𝑡=𝑡𝑏+1 𝑢[ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡)] > 𝑢[ℎ𝑗(𝑡𝑏)] + 𝛽 ∑ 𝛿(𝑡𝑏)𝑡−𝑡𝑏𝑇𝑡=𝑡𝑏+1 𝑢[ℎ𝑗(𝑡)] − 𝜂𝑗 , (31) 
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When the (31) is satisfied the harvesting strategy defined before time 𝑡𝑏, 𝐻𝑜𝑝𝑡, is still the 
dominant strategy even at time 𝑡𝑏. 
This condition is always guaranteed when the marginal disutility for a marginal increase of 
the difference ℎ𝑗(𝑡) − ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡) is larger than the marginal utility evaluated for each harvesting 
amount in the interval (ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡𝑏),  ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑡𝑏)] weighted for the present bias factor 𝛽. We can 
also assert the following proposition that express the sufficient condition for the maintenance 
of the optimal harvesting path, neutralizing the effect of the present bias (the proof is 
presented in the appendix): 
Proposition 2: 
Given the presence of present-biased preferences represented by parameter 𝛽, as expressed 
in the utility function in (10), and the existence of social norms that affect the utility of the 
agent, as expressed in (27) and (28), with 𝜕𝜂𝜕𝛾 > 0, we define in the interval [0, 𝑇] as the 
optimal harvesting strategy 𝐻𝑜𝑝𝑡, define with {H} the set of all the feasible strategies for the 
interval [𝑡𝑏, 𝑇] , define with {𝐻𝑗} ⊂  {H} the subset of {H} that includes all the strategy 
alternatives to 𝐻𝑜𝑝𝑡 , a subset that includes even the strategy adopted by the agent in absence 
of social norm, 𝐻𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠, if 
𝜕𝜂𝑗𝜕𝛾 ≥ (1 − 𝛽)𝑢′[ℎ𝑗(𝑡𝑏)],   ∀ ℎ𝑗(𝑡𝑏) ∈ (ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡𝑏),  ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑡𝑏)] , (32) 
Then, at time 𝑡𝑏 : 𝐻𝑜𝑝𝑡 ≻ 𝐻𝑗 ∀ 𝐻𝑗 ∈ {𝐻𝑗} ⊂ {𝐻} ∶ 𝐸[𝑈𝑜𝑝𝑡] >  𝐸[𝑈𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠 ] ∀ 𝑡𝑏 ∈ [0, 𝑇] ˄  𝛽 ∈ (0,1). (33) 
Proposition 2 clarifies the sufficient condition that guarantees, in presence of the social norm 
that prescribes the non-revaluation of the amount initially planned, that a naive present-biased 
agent will maintain the optimal harvesting path defined at the beginning. This condition is 
also the condition that can guarantee the sustainability of the resources if the amount initially 
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planned to transfer to the following generation is defined in accordance with 
intergenerational social preferences that ensure the sustainability of the resources. 
Hence, in the case of a social norm that, such as in this model, prescribes that the amount 
defined at the beginning must not be subject to revaluation, the social norm is also an 
opportunity to commit to the behavior of the agent. Thus, the presence of constraints arising 
from the social norm can lead the individual to mitigate the reevaluation of the amount to 
leave to the future generation. Moreover, under the condition expressed in Proposition 2, the 
implementation of a social norm can avoid the reevaluation of the amount of resources to 
leave to the future generations, reducing the risk of overexploitation for the effect of the 
intertemporal myopia of a naive present-biased agent.  
 
7. Discussion and final remarks 
Clearly, in the context of renewable resources, the action of one generation imposes 
externalities on subsequent generations. This work has discussed that the choices influenced 
by present-biased preferences can lead the first generation to leave to the second generation 
less than what the first generation wanted. This phenomenon is essentially an 
intergenerational preference reversal, in which the original intentions of individuals 
managing resource stocks are influenced by the strong temptation of the present, eroding the 
resource volumes to leave to future generations. Notably, we observed the conflict between 
the individual’s preferences when she or he is not subject to pressures from the present and 
the choices actually made when these preferences are influenced by present bias. Thus, the 
strategic short-sightedness imposed by the “dictatorship of the present” can cause the agent's 
choices to divert from optimal choices, reducing the well-being of future generations despite 
strong social preferences. 
Thus, present bias can imply serious damage to intergenerational equity and the sustainability 
of resources levels for future generations, even when the welfare of future generations is 
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supported by other-regarding preferences. The other-regarding preferences of a naive agent 
do not guarantee that the harvesting path will match with what is considered desirable and 
initially optimal. Resource management and conservation for future generations appears to 
be a complex task that cannot be fully solved by the spontaneous behavior of naive agents 
unable to self-commit. Even if a generation has spontaneous and intrinsic intergenerational 
preferences, the sustainability of resources for future generations faces the limit that in the 
process of decision-making over time, the choices made can be insufficient to keep the 
harvesting plan that leaves the resource amount initially suggested. If this amount had been 
defined in terms of sustainability for the future generation, the sustainability of resources, 
even if desired by the present generation, would be compromised. 
Based on this problem, this study has investigated the role of the social norm of no 
reevaluation of the amount designed for the future generation. The result obtained with the 
model presented in this paper has shown that if the social preferences of the individual are 
not left only and exclusively to their own spontaneous behavior, and if these social 
preferences are expressed by social norms that represent the individual's social preferences, 
a mitigation and a neutralization of the effect of present bias on the intergenerational equity 
can occur. This result is related to the idea that decisions on compliance/no-compliance based 
on given social norms are part of the decision-making process of the agent and part of her or 
his preferences. Notably, individuals also express their preferences through specific social 
norms that they believe in. Hence, through compliance with these norms, individuals express 
their preferences toward other members of the community. Individuals with social 
preferences do not act in isolation from the community they belong to. The manner in which 
social norms affect individuals’ behavior is one of the prerogatives of society. A community 
is also based on the relatively widespread adoption of specific social norms and clearly 
identifiable habits, whose adoption by an individual qualifies her or him in very specific 
terms. The compliance with social norms notably elicits the self-image of the agents. Agents 
receive a benefit by expressing themselves through actions that are in compliance with their 
self-image and social identity. Thus, compliance with social norms is in this manner an 
expressive utility (Sunstein and Reisch, 2014). Furthermore, social disapproval can induce 
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individuals to conform to the social norm: they obtain utility from the social endorsement or 
moral utility (Levitt and List, 2007). 
Consistent with this approach, the analysis of the role of the social norm conducted in this 
paper shows that to possibly reduce the effect of present bias on the transferred amount to 
the future generation, the social norm should generate a strictly marginal increasing disutility 
that the agent receives based on the increase in the difference between the amount effectively 
harvested and the amount initially planned. Thus, the disutility of a non-compliant behavior 
to the norm must target the present behavior of the agent by reducing her or his utility in 
relation to the increase in her or his present harvesting compared with the amount initially 
planned. 
One of the main contributions of this paper is the definition of the condition in which the 
adoption of the social norm guarantees the neutralization of the effect of present bias on the 
transferred amount to the future generation. Specifically, we have proven that if the marginal 
disutility derived from the violation of the social norm is larger than the present-biased 
weighted marginal utility, even a naive agent will maintain the harvesting path that guarantees 
the optimality initially defined. We have demonstrated the positive and important role that 
social norms that sustain other-regarding preferences of the agents have in the 
intergenerational equity in the management of renewable resources. 
The social constraint that arises from the norm in this model, while an expression of the same 
other-regarding preferences, offsets the effects of short-sighted behaviors—where a naive 
agent takes her or his own decisions only under the influence of present bias—that in absence 
of social norms are without substantial barriers. In the context of intertemporal management 
of resources, the social norms should have the crucial role of expressing the other-regarding 
preferences of the agent such that she or he can keep the harvesting path as close as possible 
to the optimal path with a high compliance with the social norm. Notably, if the presence of 
the other-regarding preferences—that are necessary and essential—is not sufficient to 
guarantee intergenerational equity, the agent’s behavior must be sustained by specific 
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institutional mechanisms and brought into the community by social norms that suggest the 
behaviors more appropriately for guaranteeing the equity and availability of the resources 
between the different generations. 
In conclusion, the results obtained suggest that the transfer of resources to future generations 
can be preserved by respecting the preferences of the current generation and implementing a 
social norm that defines given behavioral heuristics. The social norm must be implemented 
in a manner such that the social preferences of the members of the community are expressed 
not only by the volume of resources they leave to the next generation, but also according to 
how this amount matches the amount initially assessed. Indeed, this would facilitate the 
effective maintenance of resource stocks to be allocated to future generations. 
 
Appendix 
Proof Proposition 1: 
At time tb, when the agent is induced by the present bias to reevaluate her or his harvesting 
plan. The amount ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑡𝑏), with ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑡𝑏) > ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡𝑏), is the only amount harvestable at 
time tb such that 𝐻𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠 ≻ 𝐻𝑖 ∀ 𝐻𝑖 ∈ {𝐻𝑖}                                                                                     ( i ) 
with {H}, we define the set of all feasible harvesting strategies defined for the interval [𝑡𝑏, T], 
and with {𝐻𝑖}  ⊂  {H} , the subset of all the feasible alternative strategies to 𝐻𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠. 
Thus, considering the disutility derived by the violation of the social norm, the condition that 
guarantees that ( i ) is still true requires that 
∑ 𝛿(𝑡)𝑢(ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑡)) − 𝜂ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠 > ∑ 𝛿(𝑡)𝑢(ℎ𝑖(𝑡)) − 𝜂ℎ𝑖𝑇𝑡=𝑡𝑏𝑇𝑡=𝑡𝑏 ,                                                ( 𝑖𝑖 ) 
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with 𝜂 ≥ 0. 
We consider all the alternative strategies to 𝐻𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠 in the subset {𝐻𝑖} that imply ℎ𝑖(𝑡𝑏) > ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑡𝑏) 
We remember that at time 𝑡𝑏, 
𝑢(ℎ𝑖(𝑡𝑏)) −  𝑢(ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑡𝑏)) < ∑ 𝛿(𝑡)𝑢(ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑡))𝑇𝑡=𝑡𝑏+1 − ∑ 𝛿(𝑡)𝑢(ℎ𝑖(𝑡))𝑇𝑡=𝑡𝑏+1 , 
thus the ( 𝑖𝑖 ) is satisfied for every 𝜂ℎ𝑖  ≥ 𝜂ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠. 
The model assumes 𝜕𝜂𝜕𝛾  ≥ 0; thus, if 𝜕𝜂𝜕𝛾 = 0, 𝜂ℎ𝑖 = 𝜂ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠. In this case, the harvesting 
decision is neutral to the social norm, and if 𝜕𝜂𝜕𝛾 > 0 , (𝜂ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠 − 𝜂ℎ𝑖) < 0; consequently, 
If 𝜕𝜂𝜕𝛾 > 0, then ∄ ℎ𝑖(𝑡𝑏) > ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑡𝑏):𝐻𝑖 ≽ 𝐻𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠∀ 𝐻𝑖 ∈ {𝐻} 
Proof Proposition 2: 
The agent will maintain the harvesting amount defined in the optimal harvesting plan if 𝐻𝑜𝑝𝑡 ≻ 𝐻𝑗 ∀ 𝐻𝑗 ∈ {𝐻𝑗} ⊂  {H} 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝐻𝑗| ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡𝑏) <  ℎ𝑗(𝑡𝑏)                                        ( 𝑖 )  
that implies 
𝑢[ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡𝑏)] + 𝛽 ∑ 𝛿(𝑡𝑏)𝑡−𝑡𝑏𝑇𝑡=𝑡𝑏+1 𝑢[ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡)] > 𝑢[ℎ𝑗(𝑡𝑏)] + 𝛽 ∑ 𝛿(𝑡𝑏)𝑡−𝑡𝑏𝑇𝑡=𝑡𝑏+1 𝑢[ℎ𝑗(𝑡)]− 𝜂𝑗 
consequently ( i ) is true if 
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𝑢[ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡𝑏)]− 𝑢[ℎ𝑗(𝑡𝑏)] + 𝜂𝑗𝛽  >  { ∑ 𝛿(𝑡𝑏)𝑡−𝑡𝑏𝑇𝑡=𝑡𝑏+1 𝑢[ℎ𝑗(𝑡)] − ∑ 𝛿(𝑡𝑏)𝑡−𝑡𝑏𝑇𝑡=𝑡𝑏+1 𝑢[ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡)]} ( 𝑖𝑖 ) 
because 𝜂𝑗 > 0 ∧  𝛽 < 1 and because  
𝑢[ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡𝑏)]− 𝑢[ℎ𝑗(𝑡𝑏)] > ∑ 𝛿(𝑡𝑏)𝑡−𝑡𝑏𝑇𝑡=𝑡𝑏+1 𝑢[ℎ𝑗(𝑡)] − ∑ 𝛿(𝑡𝑏)𝑡−𝑡𝑏𝑇𝑡=𝑡𝑏+1 𝑢[ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡)] 
 ( ii ) is true when 𝑢[ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡𝑏)]− 𝑢[ℎ𝑗(𝑡𝑏)] + 𝜂𝑗𝛽  ≥ 𝑢[ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡𝑏)]− 𝑢[ℎ𝑗(𝑡𝑏)]                                                                 ( 𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) 
Thus, if 𝜂𝑗𝛽 ≥ 𝛽 − 1𝛽 𝑢[ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡𝑏)] + 1 − 𝛽𝛽 𝑢[ℎ𝑗(𝑡𝑏)] 
from which 
𝜂𝑗 ≥ (1 − 𝛽)∫ 𝑢′[ℎ(𝑡)]ℎ𝑗(𝑡𝑏)ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡𝑏) 𝑑ℎ(𝑡𝑏)                                                                                                    ( 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) 
From ( iiii ), finally, ( i ) is true when 
𝜕𝜂𝑖𝜕𝛾 ≥ (1 − 𝛽)𝑢′[ℎ(𝑡𝑏)],    ∀  ℎ𝑖(𝑡𝑏) ∈ (ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡𝑏), ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑡𝑏)]                                                           ( 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) 
Because of the monotonicity of the utility function and because 𝛽 < 1, ( iiiii ) requires 
𝜕𝜂𝑖𝜕𝛾 > 0; that it is the necessary condition defined in Proposition 1. 
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